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The cost of reducing scientific uncertainty
concerning hormesis: a commentary on
Professor Cross's paper
VR Walker

Professor Cross provides a preliminary examination
of how the regulatory structure of the United States
might deal with the reality of hormetic effects. My
comments focus on only one aspect of that issue:
the scientific uncertainty in fact-finding about
hormetic effects, and the cost of reducing such
uncertainty to an acceptable level. Under federal
law in the United States, administrative actions are
generally unlawful if a court finds them to be
"arbitrary or capricious".' In practice, this means
that in order for a rulemaking, licensing decision,
or administrative order to be lawful, there must be
a rational basis for the action. The administrative
action must be based on a consideration of all the
relevant factors, and there must be an understandable, coherent rationale for the decision that
is justified under the agency's statutory mandate.2 4
My main points in these comments are that factfinding about hormetic effects must be warranted
by the available evidence, that the cost of reducing
scientific uncertainty about hormetic effects in
particular cases is substantial and sometimes
prohibitive, and that the science policies needed
to fill the residual gaps in scientific information
must continue to be justified within the confines of
the relevant statutory mandates.
Regulatory policy in the United States has
recognized the possibility of hormetic curves for
decades, although indirectly. A hormetic doseresponse curve such as the one in Professor Cross's
Fig. 4 is a special case of a dose-response curve in
which there is a threshold for adverse effects. Point
E. (at which relative risk equals 1.0) is the
threshold point at which adverse effects begin to
occur as exposure increases. Regulatory agencies
have seldom had reason to determine the shape of
the dose-response curve below the threshold. Any
agency that is not allowed to balance benefits
against risks has no reason to determine whether
hormetic benefits occur. For any agency that is
permitted to take benefits into account, the expected
benefits of determining the shape of the subthreshold portion of the dose-response curve must be

weighed against the costs. I will suggest that the
cost of finding the shape of the dose-response
curve below the threshold is usually substantial,
and may be prohibitive.
The shape of the hormetic portion of any particular
dose-response curve is a question of empirical fact, to
be determined only on the basis of adequate scientific
evidence. Figure 1 is a modified version of Professor
Cross's Fig. 4. The existence of a hormetic effect
means that the tipping point Et, "where [according
to Professor Cross I human health is maximized," is
not identical to Eo. I have inserted two gray error
bars or confidence intervals (and question marks at
the ends of each bar) to indicate that there is a
range of relative risk values that is consistent with
any given data. Due to sampling uncertainty, any
given set of data is not statistically significant for
rejecting a population relative risk anywhere within
the confidence interval. That is, the subthreshold
portion of the curve could take many different
shapes, consistent with any given data.
Attempts to reduce sampling uncertainty about
the shape of the subthreshold curve are attempts to
reduce the width of the confidence intervals around
the data points. In general, the width of a
confidence interval for relative risk is a function
of the sample size - increasing the size of the
sample decreases the width of the interval, other
factors being equal.5 At a minimum, the confidence
interval has to be narrow enough to allow a
warranted finding of a difference between test
groups and controls. For example, in Figure 1, if
the confidence interval around point Et is so wide
that it includes a relative risk of 1.0, we would not
be warranted in finding any hormetic effect at all.
This is because a relative risk equal to 1.0 is
evidence that there is no difference in effect rate
between the test and control groups. In addition, in
order to determine the shape of the subthreshold
curve, studies would have to have test groups at a
sufficient number of different exposure levels below
the threshold, in order to have enough data points
to determine the locations of Eo and Et, and the
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and benefits to society before they require any
private parties to generate data. This means that
incurring or imposing the costs of generating
scientific information about the subthreshold portion of dose-response curves must be justified on a
case-by-case and program-by-program basis. I
have elsewhere catalogued different types of scientific uncertainty, in addition to sampling uncertainty.6 But even considering only sampling
uncertainty, the cost of reducing such uncertainty
to acceptable levels is substantial, and perhaps
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shape of the curve below E.. For each exposure
level, there would have to be enough test animals
to narrow the confidence interval appropriately.
Therefore, for chemical agents with thresholds,
there may be a substantial cost of determining that
the chemical also has a hormetic effect.
In the case of carcinogenic agents, the cost of
generating similar data would be prohibitive and
seldom, if ever, economically feasible. We seldom
have evidence even of a carcinogen's threshold, due
to a combination of factors. The first is sample size,
as mentioned above. The second is the rarity of the
adverse event, relative to background rates (the
rates in controls). The carcinogenic effects we are
looking for may be relatively rare, especially at low
exposures, and sample sizes would have to be large
in order to find that the lack of a statistically
significant difference between test groups and
controls is not simply due to chance. Third,
carcinogenicity studies normally must be conducted
over the whole lifetime of the test animals. Therefore, even using strains of animals bred to reduce
the background rate of cancer, the cost of an
adequate study to identify a threshold of a carcinogen is prohibitive. A fortiori, generating the data
needed to establish the location of Et and the shape
of the curve below the threshold would hardly ever
be economically feasible.
All agencies, even those with statutory mandates
only to protect health or safety, must conduct their
own data-generating activities within limited budgets. Moreover, all agencies should weigh the costs

prohibitive.
When the cost of generating adequate data about
hormetic effects is too high, can agencies proceed
without such data? The lack of scientific data about
an important step in the risk or benefit assessment
process is the primary rationale for instituting
science policies.7 If risk assessments could actually
be performed on the basis of adequate evidence at a
reasonable cost, there would be far less reason to
have science policies at all. But when agencies
adopt science policies to guide fact-finding, those
policies must be justified by reasoning based on
statutory objectives, or else the resulting factfinding will fail to satisfy the "arbitrary or capricious" standard. Statutes enacted for the purpose of
protecting health and safety provide a rationale for
adopting conservative science policies. On the other
hand, if a less protective science policy is to be
adopted, the agency would need to articulate a
policy objective that weighs against health and
safety and that justifies some particular stopping
point short of conservative protection. Those agencies that are allowed by law to weigh benefits, risks,
and costs still need a policy justification for
adopting science policies that are less than conservative. Useful rationales have been hard to come
by.
Finally, I concur with Professor Cross that the
possibility of hormetic effects brings up a management issue similar to the Food Quality Protection
Act's requirement that cumulative exposures be
taken into account. Even if someone were to
generate sufficient scientific evidence to warrant a
finding that there is a hormetic effect from a low
dose of some compound C, that finding alone does
not answer the question of how such an optimal
dose should be administered or obtained. That dose
could be ingested as a dietary supplement or
through normal diet, could be dermally absorbed
from a cream, could be ingested through water, or
could be inhaled. Any of these exposures could be
either voluntary or without specific consent. One
legal problem, as Professor Cross notes, is that our
array of health, safety, and environmental laws
would have to be rewritten in order to address this
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management question coherently. For historical
reasons, current laws are organized primarily
around route of exposure (water, air, etc.) or
instrument of exposure (food, drug, etc.). Massive
bureaucracies and political coalitions are entrenched
within those jurisdictional boundaries, and have an
interest in defending them. Another problem is that
very few current laws provide any economic

incentive even to generate data about hormetic

effects, as a requirement for marketing a product
conducting an activity. Until some rational

or

restructuring of those laws is achieved, very few
agencies or private parties will have any economic
incentive to fund the generation of the needed data
on hormesis, even where the generation of that data
is feasible.
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